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Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 21 February 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government and further to the report of the Secretary-General on the situation covering Western Sahara of 19 February 2002 (S/2002/178), I have the honour to transmit to you the following comments and observations:

1. Algeria would first of all like to express its appreciation and gratitude to the Secretary-General and to his Personal Envoy, James Baker III, for their untiring efforts to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara. In this connection, it would like to commend the realism, lucidity and objectivity demonstrated by them in drafting the report and its conclusions.

2. Algeria considers that, after the legal opinion of 29 January 2002 (S/2002/161) — which clearly and appropriately recalled and confirmed the fact that the Kingdom of Morocco is unlawfully occupying Western Sahara and that, consequently, it cannot claim any legitimacy or international recognition, except as an occupying Power — the report of the Secretary-General reminds us, in paragraph 48, that if the settlement plan (see S/21360 and Corr.1 and S/22464) agreed by the two parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and Western Sahara, and endorsed by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, has not been applied and if its implementation is likely to face further obstacles in the future, it is because "Morocco has expressed unwillingness to go forward with the settlement plan".

3. Algeria has taken note of the four options presented in the report (paras. 48-51) and would like to explain to the members of the Council its position concerning each of the possibilities envisaged by the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy:

- It goes without saying that the first option is the one most acceptable to Algeria, which has always fully supported implementation of the settlement

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plan, convinced that the holding of a free and impartial referendum on self-determination is the right course and the most appropriate way of enabling the people of Western Sahara, under Moroccan occupation, to decide freely on their destiny in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Algeria considers that the settlement plan can be implemented and the decolonization process in Western Sahara can be successfully completed, if only the United Nations would demonstrate the necessary commitment. In this connection, the proposal by the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy not to require the concurrence of both parties — a requirement which has enabled one of the parties now identified by the Secretary-General, as I stated earlier, to delay for over 10 years the holding of a referendum on self-determination — would permit an orderly and smooth implementation of the plan.

- On a number of occasions, Algeria has formally expressed its opposition to the draft framework agreement, specifically on the grounds that this draft — which dates back, as indicated in paragraph 35 of the report of the Secretary-General, to the Berlin meeting of 28 September 2000, when the Moroccan delegation proposed "to work out a lasting and definitive solution that would take account of Morocco's sovereignty and territorial integrity" — would constitute programmed integration with the Kingdom of Morocco.

Algeria would like to reiterate its fundamental objections to the draft framework agreement, which, whatever the degree of autonomy it might give to the population of the Territory, is defective in that it conceals a reality that must be addressed — that the question of Western Sahara is one of decolonization — and would give one country sovereignty over a territory which it occupies unlawfully.

- With respect to the third option, Algeria, anxious to continue making a full contribution to the Personal Envoy's efforts to find a lasting solution to the question of Western Sahara on the basis of the principles of equity and justice, would like to reiterate that it remains ready to examine any proposal for a peaceful settlement that would take fully into account the legitimate national interests of the Saharan people.

- As for the fourth option, Algeria earnestly hopes for a just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara that would enable the fraternal Moroccan and Saharan peoples to live in peace, stability and harmony, and permit the process of constructing the Arab Maghreb to resume its normal course and to reach natural fruition with the integration of all its peoples in a harmonious, united and prosperous whole. It considers that the United Nations must commit itself in a more decisive and resolute manner to a just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara.

4. Eager to help ease tensions and to make its contribution to the settlement of the question of Western Sahara, Algeria, as a country observing the implementation of the settlement plan and as a neighbouring country, will continue its unconditional support for the efforts by the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara in accordance with international law. It calls on the United Nations and specifically the

Security Council to assume fully their responsibilities towards the Saharan people under the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 18, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah **Baali**
Ambassador

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. In its presidential statement of 31 October 2001, the Security Council requested me to undertake a number of steps with respect to Somalia and to submit reports, at least every four months, on the situation in the country and the efforts to promote the peace process, including updates on the scope and contingency planning for launching a United Nations peace-building mission in Somalia. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. The present report covers the period since my last report of 11 October 2001 (S/2001/963). In addition to an account of political developments, the humanitarian situation and activities of United Nations agencies, it contains an update on the renewed efforts by countries of the region in support of national reconciliation in Somalia as well as the results of consultations held by my Special Adviser, Mohamed Sahnoun, with the Heads of State of member countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), including those of the inter-agency security assessment mission that the Security Council asked me to despatch to Somalia. My observations, particularly regarding the establishment of a United Nations post-conflict peace-building office in Somalia, are based largely on the findings of those two missions.

II. Political developments

A. Internal political situation

3. On 12 October 2001, several members of the Transitional National Assembly put forward a motion of no-confidence in the Transitional National Government, accusing it of financial mismanagement and of failing to improve the economic and security situation in the country and to move the national reconciliation process forward. The motion was passed on 28 October. On 12 November, Hassan Abshir Farah, the Minister of Water Resources of the Transitional National Government, was named the new Prime Minister.

4. The Transitional National Government has stated that the completion of the reconciliation process will be a top priority through talks with the faction leaders and regional administrations. In this connection, President Abdikassim Salad Hassan visited the Afgoye, Wanlewein, Brava and Merka districts of the Lower Shabelle region in November. Officials of the Transitional National Government have been working since then with local leaders to help establish local administration in Merka. The new Prime Minister participated in the reconciliation meeting under President Moi's auspices in Kenya in December 2001 (see paras. 14 to 18 below). Although he had initially postponed the selection of his cabinet, reports indicate that he began the process of naming a cabinet on 16 February 2002.

5. Discussions between the Transitional National Government and Osman Hassan Ali "Atto" continued during the meetings in Kenya. Prime Minister Hassan Abshir Farah also took the opportunity to consult Jama Ali Jama, the new president of "Puntland", who attended the talks as an observer. The five co-chairmen of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council did not participate in the meetings and continued their categorical refusal to recognize the Transitional National Government. Prime Minister Abshir also held talks with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia in

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Addis Ababa and President Ismail Omar Guelleh in Djibouti to solicit their support for national reconciliation in Somalia. On 11 February 2002, the Eritrean Ambassador to Somalia presented his credentials to President Hassan in Mogadishu.

6. The secretary-general of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council participated in the reconciliation meetings held in Kenya in November and December 2001. Omar Mohamed Mohamud "Finnish", a deputy of Musse Sudi "Yallahow" (one of the faction leaders based in Mogadishu), also attended the talks in December. This led to a violent confrontation between the militia of Musse Sudi and Omar "Finnish" in Mogadishu on 27 and 28 December 2001, in which a number of people, including civilians, were killed.

7. The political crisis in "Puntland" has not been resolved. The protracted Garowe conference of elders finally elected Jama Ali Jama, a former member of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and a well-known opponent of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, as the new president of the "Puntland State of Somalia" on 14 November. Colonel Yusuf rejected the outcome and returned with his forces to Garowe. Mr. Jama retreated to Bosasso claiming that Ethiopian troops had crossed into Somalia in support of Colonel Yusuf. Ethiopian officials have dismissed the allegations as baseless.

8. On 11 January, a delegation of elders went from Bosasso to Garowe to hold talks with Colonel Yusuf and senior clan members. At the end of the consultations, on 26 January, the elders called on both Colonel Yusuf and Mr. Jama to remove their respective militia and weapons from Garowe. Mr. Jama claimed that he had no militia in the town. Colonel Yusuf has not yet reacted.

9. The leader of "Somaliland", Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, continues to keep his distance from the Transitional National Government. In December, he told a visiting IGAD delegation, led by the Special Envoy of the President of Sudan on Somalia, that he was not interested in participating in any reconciliation talks on Somalia.

10. Mr. Egal's administration has been trying to institute a multi-party system in "Somaliland", as opposed to governance under the guidance of the traditional council of elders. However, there continues to be some resistance to those efforts, particularly from a group of traditional elders in Burao and some politicians who aspire to succeed Mr. Egal. Seven registered political organizations were expected to compete in municipal elections, which were to have been held on 20 December 2001 following the passing of an electoral law on 17 November. The elections were, however, postponed. Since then, Mr. Egal has been given a one-year extension by the upper house of the "Somaliland" Parliament.

11. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the President of the United States of America signed an Executive Order, on 23 September, blocking the assets of organizations and individuals linked to terrorism, including Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a Somali organization. The list of persons and organizations subject to the order has since been expanded to include a number of Somali individuals and Al-Barakaat Group of Companies Somalia, Ltd.

12. On 31 October, President Hassan met with my representative for Somalia in Nairobi and denied any linkage between his administration and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. He noted that, although the Transitional National Government did not control the whole country, it had a good information network to keep abreast of developments. Since then, the Transitional National Government has established an anti-terrorism task force (S/2001/1287). Opposition groups, particularly the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council and Colonel Yusuf, have alleged that the leadership of the Transitional National Government is pro-Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya and that it was linked to al-Qa'idah.

13. On 7 November, the United States Treasury shut down the offices of Al-Barakaat Group offices in the United States and urged its partners in the coalition to do the same. The United States Secretary of the Treasury said that Al-Barakaat Group was "a principal source of funding, intelligence and money transfers for Osama bin Laden". The United Arab Emirates, the headquarters of Al-Barakaat Group, followed suit by blocking its accounts. The company continues to insist that it has engaged in no such activities. President Hassan expressed surprise at the charges against Al-Barakaat Group and set up a commission to look into its records.

B. Regional and other peace initiatives

14. President Moi convened a reconciliation meeting between the Transitional National Government and other Somali leaders in Nairobi from 1 to 4 November 2001. A number of leaders of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council who were in Ethiopia at the time stated that they would not attend the meeting or have any representatives there because they had resolved never to sit with the "Arta faction" as long as it claimed to be the Government, with Mr. Hassan as its President. They also called for all-inclusive consultations supervised by IGAD and blamed the Arta conference for the economic problems and insecurity in the country. Colonel Yusuf insisted that he would only attend the meeting if President Hassan declared that he was not President. Mr. Egal accepted President Moi's invitation but stated that he would not meet any other Somali leader in Nairobi and would only consult President Moi.

15. Other opposition leaders, including Osman "Atto" and the secretary-general of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council did, however, attend the meeting. The communiqué issued at the conclusion stated that agreement had been reached on an eight point agenda for future dialogue. These included agreement to: implement the decisions and resolutions of IGAD, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Security Council on the situation in Somalia; review all state laws in accordance with the requirement for reconciliation; share power on the basis of Somali clans; undertake national disarmament; renounce violence as a means of settling political differences; cooperate with the international community in the eradication of terrorism; and commit themselves to peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries.

16. On 5 November, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the outcome of the Nairobi meeting. Ethiopia said it looked forward to the IGAD subcommittee on Somalia carrying out its responsibility of bringing together the Somali parties to make real progress in the peace process. On 12 November, an envoy of President Moi briefed Prime Minister Zenawi in Addis Ababa on President Moi's efforts and sought the support of Ethiopia. My representative for Somalia was made to understand that the Prime Minister, after praising President Moi's efforts, stated that he would prefer an IGAD initiative.

17. President Moi convened a second round of reconciliation talks among Somali leaders in Kenya, from 13 to 24 December 2001, at the conclusion of which three separate agreements were signed between the Transitional National Government and the opposition groups represented there, including: the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, led by Osman "Atto" (none of the five co-chairmen of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council was present); the United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance, led by Omar "Finnish"; and the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance. The three near-identical agreements called for an all-inclusive government to be formed within one month, with the Transitional National Government proposing to the Transitional National Assembly that the number of cabinet members and parliamentarians be increased to make way for a broader-based government. The Kenyan authorities announced their intention of establishing an international secretariat on Somalia in Nairobi to implement the peace process and to solicit donor funding for it. On 20 January 2002, the Transitional National Assembly passed a motion to increase the number of cabinet ministers. The Transitional National Assembly also agreed to set up a committee to discuss the option of increasing the number of parliamentarians.

18. In a statement issued on 7 January, the Transitional National Government claimed that Ethiopia had attempted to sabotage the reconciliation meetings in Kenya by influencing some faction leaders to boycott them. The Transitional National Government also claimed that Ethiopia was recruiting and training nearly 5,000 young men inside Somalia with the aim of inflaming a "new civil war" and that trucks carrying nearly 200 Ethiopian soldiers had arrived in Baidoa on 30 December. It called on the Security Council to condemn the Ethiopian Government for "funding, training and arming anti-establishment militia". Ethiopia has denied these allegations.

19. The Joint IGAD Partners Forum met in Addis Ababa on 20 November 2001, during which the Special Envoy of the President of Sudan on Somalia requested donor support to hold a comprehensive reconciliation and pledging conference on Somalia. He subsequently led a joint IGAD mission, represented by Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan and the IGAD secretariat, to Somalia and Addis Ababa from 20 to 31 December. The mission's recommendations included the need to

adopt a unified approach to the peace process in Somalia and a call for a national reconciliation conference.

C. Consultations of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Somalia

20. My Special Adviser, Mohamed Sahnoun, undertook, at my request, a mission to the region to represent me at the 9th IGAD Summit (10-11 January 2002) in Khartoum and to ascertain the views and concerns of IGAD member countries as to how the international community could support their efforts to foster national reconciliation in Somalia.

21. The IGAD Heads of State gave the question of national reconciliation in Somalia due attention and importance during the Summit. The IGAD resolution, which was adopted by consensus on 11 January 2002, called for Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya to coordinate efforts under the supervision of the IGAD Chairman as well as for the holding of a Somalia reconciliation conference in Nairobi within two months, with President Moi as coordinator. An IGAD Ministerial Committee is to prepare the agenda for the conference. The Summit called on the international community to join IGAD in its efforts to establish peace in Somalia.

22. After holding talks with Heads of State and senior officials of IGAD countries, as well as with members of the IGAD Partners Forum in Khartoum, my Special Adviser proceeded to Nairobi and Addis Ababa to discuss how the United Nations could assist IGAD countries in implementing their decision and facilitating the convening of the upcoming conference. He also met donors, the diplomatic community, Somali leaders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), experts and the United Nations Country Team for Somalia.

23. My Special Adviser reported to me that the IGAD Heads of State had reflected in depth on the issue and reached an important decision. His interlocutors noted that the situation in and relating to Somalia had changed considerably and that Somalis were tired of conflict and division. Furthermore, the Governments of IGAD member States had realized that tolerating the existence of a failed state could be a recipe for regional instability and other dangers, including possible terrorist activity in Somalia and its international repercussions. On 1 February, the Presidency of the European Union welcomed the IGAD resolution on Somalia and the decision to hold a reconciliation conference in Kenya, and expressed the readiness of the European Union to examine ways and means to support IGAD's efforts to assist Somalis to achieve peace and national reconciliation.

24. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of IGAD member States met in Nairobi on 14 February to discuss ways and means of advancing the decision on national reconciliation in Somalia taken at their 9th Summit. The Ministers underscored the need for intensifying the national reconciliation process aimed at working towards a broad-based and all-inclusive government, while maintaining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia. They established a technical committee, comprised of the frontline States (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) and the IGAD secretariat and chaired by Kenya, to work out the modalities for the proposed National Reconciliation Conference for Somalia, which is to be convened by Kenya in the second half of April 2002. The Conference would include the Transitional National Government and all other Somali parties without conditionalities. The Ministers appealed for the active involvement of the United Nations in the Somali national reconciliation process and in the rehabilitation and restoration of peace and stability in Somalia.

25. My Special Adviser also reported that there was support in principle by all concerned for re-establishing the Committee of Friends on Somalia, both in Nairobi and at United Nations Headquarters. The Committee would focus on ways and means of drawing attention to Somalia's needs in the area of national reconciliation, help mobilize funds for rehabilitation and development and support the decision on Somalia adopted at the 9th IGAD Summit.

III. Inter-agency security assessment in Somalia

26. In response to the request of the Security Council, a Headquarters-led inter-agency mission was dispatched to Somalia. The Mission, comprising the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as a representative of the Department of Political Affairs, undertook a broad assessment of security conditions in accessible areas from 15 to 23 January. It visited Hargeisa and Berbera in "Somaliland", Baidoa and Burr Hakabah in Bay Region, Belet Weyne in Hiran Region, Jowhar and Mahadday Weyne in Middle Shabelle Region, Merka in Lower Shebelle Region and Mogadishu. The Mission had unimpeded access to all locations, groups and individuals with which it sought contact.

27. The Mission found that Somalia remains one of the most dangerous environments in which the United Nations operates. Conditions related to the security of United Nations staff in Somalia still vary radically from place to place and are often very difficult to predict.

28. The Mission noted that while the Transitional National Government has expanded its influence, various de facto authorities continue to control most parts of the country, as well as sections of Mogadishu. The most obvious example is "Somaliland", which has maintained a high degree of autonomy for six years. The Transitional National Government and most of the other authorities have instituted varying degrees of stability and administrative order within their respective areas, allowing civilians to resume economic, social and, in some instances, political activities. Traditional rulers and civil society also play a greater role. However, since the country remains highly militarized, when these groups compete (which they do on a regular basis) for the limited political, economic and social entitlements available, unpredictable and violent clashes often result. In this context, threats against United Nations staff and assets become significant.

29. The Mission noted a trend towards improved security conditions in "Somaliland", Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle regions. Authorities in those areas expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with the United Nations and have undertaken efforts to maintain peace and stability and thus create an enabling environment for United Nations programmes. The Mission found access to strategic sites, such as airports and primary road networks in those regions, sufficient for ensuring safe access for United Nations staff and assets.

30. The authorities in control of most of the areas surveyed provided verbal assurances for the protection of United Nations staff and assets. The Mission noted, however, that the assurances given were of varying degrees of credibility based on the tenure and disposition of the authority in question. "Somaliland" appeared to present the best assurances of commitment to ensuring staff safety. Authorities in Bay and Bakool regions, an alliance of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council and the Rahanwein Resistance Army, also provided credible assurances of the safety of United Nations staff operating in their areas. However, in Middle Shabelle, the relative stability in the region appeared linked to one individual. Thus, guarantees of staff security in Middle Shabelle may be subject to sudden change and will require close monitoring.

31. Authorities in Mogadishu provided inconclusive guarantees for staff security. The President of the Transitional National Government spoke frankly of requiring assistance from the United Nations in order for it to ensure the safety of United Nations staff. In the view of the Mission, the still unresolved and contested situation in Mogadishu does not at this time lend itself to sustainable guarantees from the authorities for the maintenance of staff safety. The lack of a single authority through which the United Nations can engage within Mogadishu and the continued closure of the air and sea ports do not bode well for an increased United Nations presence there. The Mission felt that these issues must be addressed prior to considering further engagement by the United Nations.

32. All authorities surveyed requested more assistance from the United Nations and most chastised the Organization for giving preference to the Transitional National Government. Authorities in Middle Shabelle and "Somaliland" cited a double standard, expressing the opinion that while they had brought a degree of stability to their areas, they had not received as much assistance as the Transitional National Government. The Mission noted that, even though it was mandated to assess the security situation, all factions and groups surveyed, including the Transitional National Government, attempted to use its visit to increase support from their various constituencies. As long as assistance remains a "high-stakes" game in Somalia, there will be a high risk that United Nations staff may be caught in political clashes and subjected to threats and physical acts of violence.

33. The Mission noted with concern the reported training of militia and plans for major offensives. In the south, the forces of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, under the command of General "Morgan", are estimated to have 5,000 to 8,000 militia in training for an offensive against Kismayo and possibly Brava and/or Merka. In the north-east, Colonel Yusuf has a strong trained militia presence in Garowe and reportedly intends to move north to retake Bosasso. Both actions, although not necessarily a direct threat to United Nations operations, could seriously affect the relative stability in the regions concerned and could further marginalize the influence of the Transitional National Government. United Nations staff and assets could get caught indirectly in the various conflict zones or become targets in the ongoing clan and political conflicts that are still very much evident in the country.

34. The Mission was of the view that although many regions of Somalia may appear to provide an enabling environment for increased United Nations programmes, a high degree of caution must be maintained to ensure staff safety. For this reason, the Mission supported the continuation of the present United Nations Security Management System in Somalia, which it found appropriate to the present level of threat and United Nations engagement. The security regime supports the United Nations practice of incremental engagement with Somali communities that are moving towards peace through constant evaluation of security conditions combined with the capacity to effect rapid relocations and other movements of staff and assets, as circumstances dictate. The Mission observed that increased flexibility and engagement by the United Nations in Somalia would require a commensurate expansion of the security regime. The Mission also recommended that in future greater effort be made to ensure even-handedness and transparency in the execution of United Nations assistance programmes to communities in need. Furthermore, it concluded that, following the logic of incremental engagement presently in effect in Somalia, greater effort should be made by the United Nations to ensure that the "peace dividend" aspect of such targeted assistance is fully effected.

IV. The humanitarian and development situation

35. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains grave. United Nations agencies have expanded their operations to deliver food and nutritional assistance to vulnerable populations, as well as increased the availability of safe water supplies. However, the underlying economic problems of conflict-induced destitution and displacement have prevented sustainable recovery. Further resources, including the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia request for $83.7 million, remain urgently needed to increase assistance to save lives and rebuild livelihoods.

36. Due to average *deyr* (secondary) season rains (October-December 2001) in most parts of the country, except Gedo region in the south-west and Bari region in the north-east, maize and sorghum production is expected to reach almost 161,000 metric tons and food and water security in key areas now facing vulnerability, including Bay, Bakool and Hiran regions, could improve.

37. However, areas with failed rains such as Gedo and Bari will continue to experience harsh conditions and high malnutrition rates, necessitating continuing emergency interventions to support food security, supplementary feeding and water availability. Longer-term interventions to stimulate economic recovery, rebuild household asset bases and promote sustained productivity are required to escape Somalia's continued fluctuating output pattern.

38. The situation in Gedo region is cause for the greatest humanitarian concern in Somalia today. Malnutrition rates and admissions to feeding centres rose sharply following virtually no rain in Bulo Hawo, Dolo and Luuq districts during the *gu* season (March to May), in the second quarter of 2001. Over the past three months, the arrival of the *deyr* season was expected to alleviate harsh conditions. However, the northern districts of Gedo region again received far too little *deyr* rainfall. No reprieve is expected until the next *gu* season. Food security in Gedo is unlikely to improve significantly given the impact of drought on the pastoral sector and the reduced purchasing power of communities.

39. A large area of Bari region is also affected by the failure of the *deyr* and coastal *xays* rains, which have

resulted in poor pasture and tripling of the price of water. Signs of wasting livestock are evident, indicating that many might not withstand the stresses of the upcoming dry *jilaal* season. It is also assumed that livestock herds are larger than they should be, because of the ongoing livestock ban by the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia.

40. A meningitis (type A) outbreak was confirmed in north-west Somalia, with a total of 64 cases identified, mostly in Hargeisa. In January 2002, an additional seven cases were confirmed between Gabiley and Awbarkhadle and three cases in Somali refugee camps in Ethiopia, creating concern that the disease might spread along major travel routes within "Somaliland" and Ethiopia. The World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, Medecins Sans Frontières-Holland and other partners in the north-west undertook a successful vaccination campaign throughout the area in January, with particular emphasis on Hargeisa. An estimated 240,000 people (from 2 to 40 years of age) were targeted during the campaign.

V. Operational activities in support of peace

41. In a context of general insecurity, Somalia presents a complex challenge to humanitarian and development activities. In some areas, the humanitarian imperative is key. There are, however, others where United Nations agencies are moving to introduce early recovery and development programme activities. These initiatives seek to build upon and sustain humanitarian inputs and contribute to overall United Nations peace-building objectives.

42. The majority of United Nations humanitarian and developmental programmes are implemented in all regions and therefore involve dialogue and engagement with all authorities. WHO and UNICEF support the restoration and provision of public health services and disease prevention, including national immunization days for polio eradication, as well as programmes to combat HIV/AIDS and female genital mutilation. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UNICEF have worked on the development and distribution of a national curriculum and teacher training for schools. Such programmes involve the collaboration of Somali counterparts on the technical aspects of social service provision.

43. The United Nations is further engaged as caretaker in areas where the absence of an internationally recognized national authority could prevent operations. Due to the continued absence of a central Somali aviation authority with the capacity to provide essential aviation services, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority continues to perform the functions of a civil aviation authority for Somalia. It maintains a dialogue with regional and local authorities and the private sector and has established a joint coordinating committee to ensure Somali participation in programme execution as well as assisting Somali aviation authorities in enhancing their functional effectiveness through capacity-building exercises. Nonetheless, a severe reduction in air traffic has led to a dramatic decrease in revenue from overflight and landing fees for the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority, which has greatly affected its ability to provide continued services by self-financing. This has impeded its ability to respond to ever increasing demands for the rehabilitation of the Somali air transport infrastructure.

44. UNDP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) are collaborating to promote the lifting of the ban on livestock exports from Somalia to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States following an outbreak of Rift Valley fever. A project has been initiated to hold talks on livestock trade between importers from the Middle East and exporters from the Horn of Africa, as well as to develop scientific and practical strategies to reduce the risk of Rift Valley fever.

45. UNDP has initiated a programme to support macro-economic planning and management in Somalia, mainly to address some of the constraints inhibiting the growth of the private sector. One of the projects supports the establishment of a monitoring and regulatory framework for money transfer companies to facilitate their operations locally and internationally.

46. UNDP supported the visit of a high-level delegation from the Transitional National Assembly to South Africa to observe how a legislature in a post-conflict situation promotes reconciliation among communities and groups and how conflict resolution mechanisms can be promoted.

47. Over the past decade, United Nations agencies have implemented a number of activities aimed at community-based peace-building and interaction. Such efforts have included civic education projects, peace centres and peace education in Somali refugee camps in the Horn of Africa, implemented by UNHCR and UNESCO. One United Nations partner, the War Torn Societies Project, has been actively involved in facilitating jointly sponsored research into priority areas for social and economic reconstruction and promoting policy dialogue among the main civil society, political, business and traditional leaders in communities. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has established programmes to support women's participation in peace-building at all levels.

48. Since 1995, as some stable administrations have emerged in parts of Somalia, United Nations agencies have engaged in post-conflict activities supporting governance structures, rule of law programmes and demobilization of militia. Since the Transitional National Government came into being, they have expanded those programmes. Consequently, components of peace-building activities now exist within the United Nations strategy for Somalia, as outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal. These activities include rule of law and human rights programmes, demobilization, governance and institution-building.

49. A Demobilization Task Force has been established by UNDP within the Somali Aid Coordination Body, representing all United Nations agencies, international NGOs and donors working on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. This group meets monthly in Nairobi to review, plan and coordinate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration work in Somalia. Three field coordination groups have been established (Garowe, Hargeisa and Mogadishu), combining international and Somali partners at the regional level and coordinating their efforts with the Demobilization Task Force in Nairobi. A range of bilateral and joint programming initiatives has been undertaken under the auspices of this coordination mechanism, resulting in considerable strengthening of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects in Somalia.

50. A consolidated inter-agency disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan for 2002, combining the efforts of all concerned agencies in a joint multisectoral and multi-agency package was finalized in January. Somali counterparts strongly endorsed the plan, including the demobilization departments of the Transitional National Government as well as the "Somaliland" and "Puntland" administrations. This should provide a firm foundation for effective coordination and delivery of international support to demobilization efforts in various parts of Somalia. Activities include: establishment of common registration and databases for militia; plans for vocational training of between 1,500 to 3,000 militia; establishment of public works for 200,000 man-days of labour for ex-combatants; pilot job creation in Mogadishu and Hargeisa; pilot psycho-social work in Hargeisa; a 1,500 force reduction in "Somaliland"; training of 40 Somali specialists for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities; public awareness; assessments in 10 new areas; and possible cantonment of 3,000 militia for three months in Mogadishu.

51. The principal areas in which the United Nations could further assist in these efforts for the demobilization of militia should be the strengthening of the existing coordinated inter-agency approach, in the following areas: provision of additional resources to support the implementation of the consolidated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan for 2002, for which an estimated $8 million is being sought; enhanced support to community-based reintegration, particularly through labour-based rehabilitation, vocational training and economic recovery, requiring an additional $2 million in donor support; and assistance to efforts to prepare a larger scale demobilization exercise through cantonment, reorientation and retraining of militia in Mogadishu, as requested by the Transitional National Government, requiring an estimated additional $2 million in donor support.

52. UNDP has recently commenced the preparatory assistance phase of a small arms reduction project for Somalia. The project will be developed in close collaboration with two ongoing UNDP projects: the UNDP disarmament, demobilization and reintegration project and the law enforcement and judicial support activities project of the Somali Civil Protection Programme. The key objective of the preparatory assistance phase will be to establish the basis for longer term project implementation, in partnership with international agencies and NGOs, based on

consultation and agreement with Somali authorities, communities and counterparts, within the framework of UNDP's development strategy to support peace-building in Somalia.

53. UNDP's approach for addressing the small arms issue in Somalia is aimed at incrementally reducing the threat posed to Somali communities by small arms. Project activity during the preparatory assistance phase will be in: research; public information and raising awareness; support to civil society; mobilization for disarmament; strengthening of local administration control of small arms; and support for the establishment of a legal framework.

54. As part of the Somali Civil Protection Programme, UNDP has been engaged in mine clearing along priority communication routes and in areas of economic importance identified in consultation with local administrations and communities. Mine clearing includes an element of capacity-building and is linked to land surveying and titling, also conducted in cooperation with local authorities and communities, as success in securing land tenure is seen as an essential component of peace-building and of sustainable economic activity.

55. UNDP has established facilities and capacity for the training of police personnel within the Somali Civil Protection Programme and has initiated both training and rehabilitation of the police force during 2001. This framework could be rapidly expanded with the provision of additional resources and personnel. The training of police personnel of the Transitional National Government is seen as a particular priority.

56. Thus far, United Nations agencies have strengthened recovery and development activities to support peace-building within Somalia. Particular focus has been given to support the rule of law, mine action, demobilization of militia and human rights

57. Future programmes will focus on particular areas. Owing to the downturn in remittances, which reduces household incomes, there will be a need for aid agencies, local and national administrations to ensure employment, particularly in urban areas. Funds will be required to improve roads, clear airstrips, clean streets and implement other labour intensive infrastructural activities. Such public works projects would only be carried out in secure areas

58. Literacy rates recorded by UNICEF and UNESCO have dropped to as low as 14 per cent for women and 17 per cent for men. There is an urgent need to assist the restoration of public education, with emphasis on vocational and literacy education for young men and women through literacy campaigns and informal education.

59. The United Nations Country Team for Somalia has endorsed assistance for a series of human rights conferences to raise the profile of human rights in the country. These will give opportunities to civil society groups to become re-engaged in the reconciliation process.

60. The United Nations Country Team for Somalia presented donors and NGOs with a detailed analysis of the United Nations operational profile and potential to expand interventions in Somalia at a high-level meeting in Geneva, on 7 February, chaired by the United Nations Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator. The Coordinator subsequently undertook a two-day mission to the Bay and Gedo regions in the south-west of Somalia to observe ongoing interventions and meet with Somali counterparts. It is expected that increasing awareness of United Nations existing projects and increasing field capacity within Somalia will help raise the profile of humanitarian and development issues and secure additional funding for essential programmes.

VI. Observations

61. The Security Council has noted that the Arta peace process is the most viable basis for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. Unfortunately, at the time of the submission of my last report, not only was the Arta process incomplete and reconciliation among the Somali parties stymied, there was also a divergence of views among the member States of IGAD regarding national reconciliation in Somalia.

62. The 9th IGAD Summit, however, refocused attention on national reconciliation in Somalia and reached an encouraging understanding regarding specific steps to be taken by the IGAD countries concerned. The IGAD decision on Somalia is also significant because it acknowledged that consensus among Somalia's neighbours is essential in order to support a way forward in the search for a more broad-based transitional arrangement for the country. The decision is therefore an important development and the

international community at large, and the United Nations in particular, should support and assist in its implementation.

63. I am encouraged by the decision taken by the IGAD Foreign Ministers Committee on Somalia on 14 February in which they agreed to convene a National Reconciliation Conference in the second half of April 2002, including the Transitional National Government and all other Somali parties without conditionalities. The United Nations will make every effort to support this much needed and timely initiative.

64. Reconciliation and rehabilitation in Somalia are among the key concerns of IGAD member States in the region and were rightly the subject of special attention at the IGAD summit. Since 1995, the United Nations, through its Nairobi-based Political Office for Somalia, had been closely cooperating with IGAD in efforts to foster national reconciliation in the country. For its part, the Security Council had been pressing for peace and national reconciliation and has continued to urge all parties to pursue the path of dialogue.

65. IGAD member countries and other States in the region should contribute constructively to peace efforts in Somalia. The United Nations will do all that is possible to help heal Somalia's wounds and achieve progress, including through the deployment of a post-conflict peace-building mission, once security conditions permit. However, no amount of good will, support and assistance on the part of IGAD or the international community can bring about peace in Somalia. Only Somalia's leaders can decide to end the suffering of their people and only they can decide to negotiate an end to the conflict. They need to rise above their differences and put the interests of the people of Somalia first and foremost.

66. The United Nations, through the Political Office for Somalia and its agencies, stands ready to support the IGAD initiative. In this regard, close collaboration with the IGAD Partners Forum will be important. I have asked my Special Adviser to visit the region periodically to provide additional support.

67. My Special Adviser, who held consultations in the region on practical and constructive ways of promoting coherent policy approaches toward Somalia and consolidating support for peace and reconstruction in the country, found that there is general support for my earlier proposal to establish a Committee of Friends of Somalia. I therefore intend to proceed with establishing such a Committee in Nairobi, chaired by my Representative. Another Committee of similar composition should be established in New York and should meet periodically under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

68. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains perilous. Years have been lost in terms of socio-economic and infrastructure development. It is clear that the international community must increase its programmes of assistance to Somalia in creative and innovative ways, wherever the security situation allows. It is important to note that access to strategic sites such as airports and primary road networks and the safety of United Nations staff and assets are basic requirements for increased programme implementation. I call on Somali leaders to welcome and assist in the implementation of humanitarian and socio-economic development projects and to assure the safety of United Nations staff and humanitarian workers in all parts of the country.

69. Somalia remains one of the most dangerous environments in which the United Nations operates. Security conditions for United Nations staff vary radically from place to place and are difficult to predict. In particular, the security situation in Mogadishu does not allow for a long-term United Nations presence. The inter-agency security assessment has confirmed this. Under these circumstances, a comprehensive peace-building programme cannot yet be launched in Somalia.

70. Pending the emergence of conditions conducive to the launching of a comprehensive peace-building programme, the United Nations undertakes to make greater efforts to ensure that the "peace dividend" aspect of targeted assistance is fully exploited. United Nations programmes will be expanded through humanitarian and development projects as well as specific peace-building activities focusing on community-based peace-building, reduction of small arms, police training, quick impact projects aimed at improving security and intensification of dialogue on humanitarian and development issues.

71. Despite the lack of major progress in the peace process and the existence of security conditions that prevent the United Nations from engaging more fully in Somalia, my Special Adviser reported to me that IGAD leaders and members of the international community expressed cautious optimism that, in the

light of the decision taken at the 9th IGAD Summit, a way forward could indeed be found in the national reconciliation process in Somalia. I share this cautious optimism. However, this will require political will on the part of the Somali political leaders and the sustained encouragement and support of Somalia's immediate neighbours and of the wider international community. Greater unity of purpose is needed to facilitate the return of peace and security to the country and help Somalia regain its place in the international community.

72. I would like to take this opportunity to thank my outgoing Representative, David Stephen, for his tireless efforts over four years in support of national reconciliation in Somalia and to welcome my new Representative, Winston A. Tubman, who will be assuming his duties in the very near future. I commend the entire United Nations Country Team for their dedication in support of the humanitarian rehabilitation and reconstruction needs of Somalia.

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General Assembly
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Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 21 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, continues to dramatically deteriorate owing to the brutal Israeli military assault being carried out against the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority. Today, the Israeli occupying forces persisted with fierce land, air and sea attacks against Palestinian targets throughout the Occupied Territory, including, inter alia, against several police and security installations in Gaza, Nablus, Jenin and Ramallah and official compounds of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in both Gaza City and Ramallah. More tragic than the vast destruction being wrought on the Palestinian infrastructure by these Israeli attacks, has been the resulting rise in the Palestinian death toll. In just the past two days, the Israeli forces have killed more than 25 Palestinians. This current wave of death and destruction being inflicted upon the Palestinian people by the occupying army is the direct result of orders by the Israeli Government of Ariel Sharon.

Further, for the first time, early today, Israeli troops and tanks entered Gaza City. During the incursion, the occupying forces attacked with machine-gun fire and also blew up a television transmission tower, knocking Palestinian radio and television stations off the air. An Israeli incursion was also made into the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza, with the Israeli occupying forces killing 5 Palestinians, wounding more than 35 people and demolishing a home.

In addition, the Israeli occupying forces further tightened the siege and closure imposed on the entire Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the prohibition of any Palestinian movement between cities, towns and villages. Israeli soldiers at roadblocks and checkpoints throughout the Occupied Territory repeatedly fired shots at cars and even at pedestrians trying to cross on foot. The siege has not only cut off the Palestinian people from the outside world but also isolated them in their towns and villages, preventing them from carrying out even the most basic daily activities.

02-26003 (E) 210202

This has gravely intensified the socio-economic hardships being suffered by the entire Palestinian population on the eve of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha.

In follow-up to my previous 99 letters to you regarding the grave deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 20 February 2002 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941; A/ES-10/117-S/2001/971; A/ES-10/118-S/2001/989; A/ES-10/119-S/2001/991; A/ES-10/121-S/2001/1007; A/ES-10/122-S/2001/1024; A/ES-10/123-S/2001/1036; A/ES-10/124-S/2001/1084; A/ES-10/125-S/2001/1092; A/ES-10/126-S/2001/1118; A/ES-10/128-S/2001/1149; A/ES-10/129-S/2001/1166; A/ES-10/133-S/2001/1239; A/ES-10/134-S/2001/126; A/ES-10/136-S/2002/18; A/ES-10/137-S/2002/39; A/ES-10/138-S/2002/48; A/ES-10/139-S/2002/58; A/ES-10/140-S/2002/89; A/ES-10/141-S/2002/95; A/ES-10/142-S/2002/102; A/ES-10/143-S/2002/121; A/ES-10/144-S/2002/142; A/ES-10/145-S/2002/146; A/ES-10/146-S/2002/165; A/ES-10/147-S/2002/175; and A/ES-10/148-S/2002/182), I regret to inform you that, since my letter to you on 15 February 2002, Israeli occupying forces have killed 40 Palestinians, including men, women and children, raising the total number of Palestinians killed since 28 September 2000 to 927. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Marwan **Jilani**
Chargé d'affaires

Annex to the identical letters dated 21 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem*

(Saturday, 16 February, through Thursday, 21 February 2002)

Saturday, 16 February 2002

1. Masoud Abu Jalala
2. Hassan Al-Sakran
3. Nader Al-Masri
4. Nazih Abu Sidah

Sunday, 17 February 2002

Nael Lutfi Fakir

Tuesday, 19 February 2002

1. Laila Kattawi
2. Salaheldin Farraj
3. Miriyam Al-Bahiysa
4. Muna Al-Bahiysa (10-year-old daughter of Miriyam Al-Bahiysa)
5. Abdel Wahat Al-Najjar
6. Mohammed Al-Kaseem
7. Eyad Abu Saffiyeh
8. Mohammed Ali Hamdan
9. Ali Abu Rukba

Wednesday, 20 February 2002

1. Ibrahim Al-Ali
2. Mahmoud Al-Abeet
3. Ibrahim Abu Sarar
4. Mahmoud Al-Titter
5. Ibrahim Abu Ash
6. Mahmoud Mutluck Issa
7. Yasser Al-Masdar (17 years old)
8. Odeh Balounah
9. Mohammed Khalil Al-Najjar
10. Fuad Shittayah
11. Zahi Zawatyeh
12. Mahmoud Al-Ashkar
13. Ghanim Barham
14. Zuheir Akil

* Total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 928.

15. Mohammed Al-Hashash
16. Mohammed Abu Mirsal (17 years old)
17. Khalil Miskawi
18. Issam Abu Ramdan
19. Shkeir Samra

Thursday, 21 February 2002

1. Raed Mohammed Abu Luli
2. Mohammed Al-Nims
3. Ehab Abdel Wahab
4. Bassim Al-Asaf
5. Mahmoud Abu Taha
6. Sameer Abu So'ud
7. Walid Khalid Al-Sheikh